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CHAPTER EIGHT
Copyright and Changing Systems  
of Scientific Communication 
Alexander Peukert & Marcus Sonnenberg
This article presents an overview of the role of copyright in the context of 
changing systems of scientific communication. The analyses are based on 
German and European copyright law. The primarily descriptive sections 1 and 
2 on substantive copyright law in scientific works and copyright contract law 
are oriented towards the ‘prevailing opinion’ informed by highest-instance 
case law. Section 3 reports on the criticism of currently prevailing copyright in 
scientific works and alternatives currently under discussion.
1 Scientific communication as an object of copyright protection
In order to determine the significance of copyright with respect to systems 
of scientific communication, the extent to which scientific expression and 
findings are objects of protection under copyright must be clarified.
1.1 Scientific works
Scientific works have always been included among the objects of protection 
covered by copyright. In the 19th century, they were still listed as works of 
‘literature’.1 It was only with the current Act on Copyright and Related Rights 
(hereinafter ‘Copyright Act’) of 9 September 1965 that scientific works were 
1 See Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886/1971 
(‘The expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain’).
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placed explicitly and prominently in Articles 1 and 2(1) alongside works of 
literature and art.
1.1.1 Scientific literary works 
According to Article 2(1)(1), Copyright Act, included among scientific works 
are scientific literary works, such as fixed written compositions and oral 
speech.2 However, in this respect, only the concrete ‘form’ of the thought 
process is capable of protection under copyright, rather than the scientific 
content as such.
The concrete embodiment of speech, shaped by the process of thought, is 
understood as the form capable of protection.3 The concrete text is the scientific 
literary work to the extent that it refers to an ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’. As a rule, the qualitative prerequisites for protection are fulfilled in 
the cases of whole monographs, articles, book chapters or longer text passages.4 
The capability of protection of a concrete representation reaches its end only 
where this is necessary due to scientific concerns or where there exists a general 
rule within the area under consideration.5 Brief text passages, such as a single 
sentence or sentence portion, are only accorded protection according to case 
law when these are as such particularly significant or originally formulated 
and thereby exemplify a creative characteristic.6 
Scientific teaching and scientific results (the ‘content’), on the other hand, 
are public domain and not protected by copyright.7 Hence, a scholar who, 
for example, is the first to discover or explain historical facts, relationships 
or theories in the natural sciences has no copyright on his or her intellectual 
2 See, for example, Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 15/58, 25.11.1958, GRUR 1959, pp. 251, 251 – 
Einheitsfahrschein; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 106/78, 21.11.1980, GRUR 1981, pp. 352, 353 
– Staatsexamensarbeit.
3 Rehbinder & Peukert, Urheberrecht, 17th edn, 2015, marginal note 214 ff.; European Court of Justice, 
case no. C-5/08, 16.07.2009, GRUR 2009, pp. 1041, marginal note 35 ff. – Infopaq I; Federal Supreme 
Court, case no. I ZR 9/95, 16.01.1997, ZUM-RD 1997, pp. 329, 331 ff. – CB-Infobank I; Federal Supreme 
Court, case no. I ZR 12/08, 01.12.2010, ZUM 2011, pp. 151, 155 – Perlentaucher.
4 Frankfurt Court of Appeal, case no. 11 U 66/11, 27.03.2012, ZUM 2012, pp. 574, 577 ff.; Federal 
Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 106/78, 21.11.1980, GRUR 1981, pp. 352, 355 – Staatsexamensarbeit.
5 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 106/78, 21.11.1980, GRUR 1981, pp. 352, 355 – 
Staatsexamensarbeit; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 16/89, 12.07.1990, GRUR 1991, pp. 130, 132 
ff. – Themenkatalog.
6 CJEU, case no. C-5/08, 16.07.2009, GRUR 2009, p. 1041, marginal notes 44–48 – Infopaq I (considered 
possible for the formulation ‘a forthcoming sale of the telecommunications group TDC which is 
expected to be bought’); Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 12/08, 01.12.2010, ZUM 2011, pp. 151, 
152 marginal notes 37, 39 – Perlentaucher; answers in the affirmative for the formulation ‘A cancer in 
the morale of the German nation’ from the Frankfurt Court of Appeal, case no. 11 U 66/11, 27.03.2012, 
ZUM 2012, pp. 574, 578.
7 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 106/78, 21.11.1980, GRUR 1981, pp. 352, 353 – 
Staatsexamensarbeit; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 16/89, 12.07.1990, GRUR 1991, pp. 130, 132 
ff. – Themenkatalog; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 140/09, 01.06.2011, GRUR 2011, p. 803, 
marginal note 49 ff. – Lernspiele.
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efforts – anyone may make use of this from a copyright perspective – without 
naming the scientific pioneer.8 
However, the distinction between ‘form’ and ‘content’ presents difficulties. 
The transition between both categories is, in certain cases, fluid. Thus, the 
collection, selection, allocation and arrangement of material in a specific 
outline of a text is considered capable of protection to the extent that it is not 
exhausted in a factually obvious table of contents – such as the chronological 
construction of a historical work.9 After all, the prevailing opinion also accords 
authors of scientific material protection for ‘concrete original connections, 
conclusions and evaluations’, ‘when these extend beyond the public domain 
core of scientific teachings and theories’.10 An example of this is the recognition 
in a postdoctoral thesis that Germany is the leader in earthquake research, 
even though the country is not among the particularly endangered areas.11
1.1.2 Illustrations of a scientific nature
According to Article 2(1)(7), Copyright Act, included among protected 
scientific works are: ‘Illustrations of a scientific or technical nature, such as 
drawings, plans, maps, sketches, tables and three-dimensional representations’. 
A scientific illustration is characterised by the fact that it serves to impart 
educational or instructional information about the represented object through 
the means of expression of graphic or plastic description. The purpose of 
conveying information distinguishes these works from works of art, which 
primarily appeal to aesthetic sensibilities. The means of expression through 
graphic or plastic description differentiates them from literary works, whose 
means of expression is language.12 
A typical example of a scientific illustration would be a model that represents 
a protein in a graphic form.13 Yet, the group of potentially protected illustrations 
of a ‘scientific nature’ is not limited to such clear-cut examples. Even the 
illustration of the most basic scientific discoveries – such as learning games for 
children consisting of control units and exercise books (for example, miniLUK) 
8 Entirely the prevailing opinion, see Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal note 219; 
Frankfurt Court of Appeal, case no. 11 U 66/11, 27.03.2012, ZUM 2012, pp. 574, 577; to the contrary, 
Haberstumpf, ‘Das Urheberrecht – Feind des Wissenschaftlers und des wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts?’, 
ZUM 2012, pp. 529, 536. The rules of internal scientific communication demand such a specification.
9 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 157/77, 07.12.1979, GRUR 1980, pp. 227, 231 – Monumenta 
Germaniae Historica; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 29/79, 27.02.1981, GRUR 1981, pp. 520, 521 
ff. – Fragensammlung; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 16/89, 12.07.1990, GRUR 1991, 130, 132 ff. 
– Themenkatalog.
10 Frankfurt Court of Appeal, case no. 11 U 66/11, 27.03.2012, ZUM 2012, pp. 574, 579.
11 Frankfurt Court of Appeal, case no. 11 U 66/11, 27.03.2012, ZUM 2012, pp. 574, 579.
12 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 140/09, 01.06.2011, GRUR 2011, 803, marginal note 39 m.w.N. – 
Lernspiele.
13 Frankfurt Court of Appeal, case no. 6 W 31/89, 04.04.1989, GRUR 1989, p. 589 – Eiweißkörper. 
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– are subsumed hereunder.14 At the same time, as with literary works, the 
requirements on an ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ of a scientific 
representation are low. A specific manner of representation that transcends 
everyday production in the relevant area is sufficient.15 On the other hand, 
one must recognise the principle that only the concrete ‘form’ is capable of 
protection not, however, the abstract game or representational concept (the 
‘content’).16
On the whole, it appears that copyright operates with a different 
understanding of the term ‘science’ than do the sciences in their self-description 
or constitution with respect to academic freedom. While ‘science’ is there 
defined as the serious and systematic attempt, according to content and form, 
to determine the truth in research and teaching,17 copyright-related case law 
takes the concept of a scientific work much further to include common, yet 
economically valuable, crossword puzzles and word games.18 
1.1.3 Content of legal protection
The creators of scientific literary works and representations and likewise 
the producers of scientific editions – the ‘author’ (Article 7, Copyright Act) 
– enjoy the same comprehensive legal protection as do all other authors. 
Authors’ moral rights include the right of first publication, the recognition of 
authorship and the integrity of the work (Articles 12–14, Copyright Act).19 The 
commercial exploitation rights extend to all existing and as of yet unknown 
forms of material and non-material exploitation of scientific works. Included 
are, in particular, the right to produce copies whether on a temporary or 
on a lasting basis, and this regardless of by which means of procedure or in 
which quantity they are made (Article 16(1), Copyright Act). Also included 
is the right to make a work available on the Internet (Article 19a, Copyright 
Act). Furthermore, adaptations or other transformations of a work may only 
be published or exploited with the consent of the author of the adapted or 
14 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 140/09, 01.06.2011, GRUR 2011, p. 803, marginal note 43 with 
further references – Lernspiele.
15 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 140/09, 01.06.2011, GRUR 2011, p. 803, marginal note 50 – 
Lernspiele.
16 Cologne Court of Appeal, case no. 6 U 225/08, 13.07.2012, ZUM 2012, pp. 975, 979 – Lernspiele.
17 Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 424/71, 29.5.1973, BVerfGE pp. 35, 79, 112 ff.; Constitutional 
Court, case no. 1 BvR 174, 178, 191/71 among others, 1.3.1978, BVerfGE pp. 47, 327, 367.
18 See Peukert, Das Verhältnis zwischen Urheberrecht und Wissenschaft: Auf die Perspektive kommt es 
an!, 4 JIPITEC 2012, p. 142 ff.; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 16/89, 12.07.1990, GRUR 1991, 
pp. 130, 132 ff. – Themenkatalog (‘The area of science is not only limited to research and teaching in a 
narrow constitutional sense.’); on prize competitions as scientific representation, see Munich Court of 
Appeal, case no. 6 U 2093/88, 19.09.1991, GRUR 1992, pp. 510, 510 ff.
19 The publisher is not entitled to these authorisations for the first publication of a posthumous work. See 
Article 71(1), third sentence, Copyright Act.
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transformed work (Article 23, Copyright Act). Copyright expires 70 years after 
the author’s death (Article 64, Copyright Act).
1.1.4 Limitations of protection in a scientific context
Copyright is subject to certain restrictions (‘limitations’).20 In line with the 
stipulations in various regulations, a work may be used without the author’s 
permission. Several limitations pursue the purpose of easing scientific 
communication.21
Among these limitations is, firstly, the right to quote, which, in the interest of 
general cultural and scientific advancement, serves the freedom of intellectual 
exchange of others’ ideas.22 According to Article 51, Copyright Act in particular, 
it is permissible to include individual works after publication in an independent 
scientific work for the purpose of explaining the contents if the source is clearly 
specified. The right to quote allows for the word-for-word reproduction of a 
few text passages, illustrations and images in order to document and explain 
one’s own scientific statements. More extensive reproduction of others’ text 
passages, etc. that lack an explanation of the content in one’s own work may 
be permissible in artistic text collages.23 Concerning scientific works, however, 
such an expanded interpretation of the right to quote is not recognised. Rather, 
the scientific work containing the quotation must constitute the main idea, 
while the reproduced text passages, representations, etc. remain secondary, 
and an inner connection must exist between the works or work portions used 
and the ideas of the one using the quotation.24
While quotation free of remuneration is permissible, other limitations on 
copyright in the context of the sciences are coupled with lump-sum remuneration 
obligations, which are handled by collecting societies (for example, VG Wort). 
This concept is valid in particular for the production of single copies of a work 
for private scientific use, which is permissible if and insofar as such copying 
is necessary for this purpose, that it serves no commercial purpose, and if the 
20 The same is true for related rights in scientific editions and posthumous works. See Articles 70(1), 71(1), 
third sentence, Copyright Act. 
21 Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal note 645 ff.; De la Durantaye, Allgemeine Bildungs – und 
Wissenschaftsschranke, 2014, pp. 73 ff.
22 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 32/92, 30.06.1994, GRUR 1994, pp. 800, 803 – Museumskatalog.
23 See Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 825/98, 29.06.2000, GRUR 2001, pp. 149, 151 – Germania 3; 
Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 212/10, 30.11.2011, GRUR 2012, p. 819 marginal note 14 ff. – 
Blühende Landschaften.
24 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 83/66, 03.04.1968, NJW 1968, pp. 1875, 1877 ff. – Kandinsky 
(denied for 69 reproductions of works by Kandinsky in a book on the artists’ group ‘Der blaue Reiter’); 
Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 32/92, 30.06.1994, GRUR 1994, pp. 800, 803 – Museumskatalog; 
Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 69/08, 29.04.2010, NJW 2010, p. 2731 marginal note 26 – 
Vorschaubilder I.
204
THE FUTURE OF THE SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING SYSTEM
copies are neither distributed nor communicated to the public.25 Accordingly, 
scholars themselves, or through contracting others, may produce reprographic 
and digital copies of scientific works.
In this regard, public libraries are permitted to transmit copies upon request 
(Article 53a, Copyright Act). Here, a distinction must be drawn between 
analogue paper copies and electronic copies. In response to an individual 
order, public libraries are permitted to reproduce and transmit by post or 
facsimile, individual articles published in newspapers and periodicals and also 
small parts of published works insofar as the exploitation by the person placing 
the order is permissible pursuant to Article 53, Copyright Act. Reproduction 
and transmission in other electronic forms are permissible solely as a graphic 
data file and for the purpose of scientific research, to the extent justified by 
a non-commercial purpose. Such transmission of copies in electronic form 
is, however, prohibited when access to contributions or small portions of a 
work is clearly available to members of the public at locations and times of 
their choosing through a contractual agreement under equitable conditions. In 
this regard, concerning transmission in digital form, the online offerings from 
the publisher have priority. Where such online offers exist under ‘equitable 
conditions’, public libraries must refrain from transmitting copies thereof in 
electronic form.
The latter reservation is not found explicitly among the legal regulations 
concerning the making available of works to the public for instructional and 
research purposes (Article 52a, Copyright Act). According to this provision, 
it is permissible to make available to the public already published, small, 
limited parts of a work, small-scale works, as well as individual articles from 
newspapers or periodicals for a specifically limited circle of persons for their 
personal scientific research, and for this purpose, to produce copies to the 
extent that this is necessary for the respective purpose and is justified for 
the pursuit of non-commercial aims. The intention here is to privilege small 
research teams who, in particular, store journal articles in a common online 
folder, which is protected by technical access mechanisms from the general 
access of all Internet users. This provision, however, does not permit works 
to be stored on a university’s intranet server in a way that access would be 
available to all researchers working there.26 The German Federal Supreme 
Court, however, views making available to the public as unnecessary for the 
specific purpose and thereby as prohibited if the rightholder offers the works 
or portions thereof in a digital form for use on the network of the individual 
25 See Article 53(2)(1) and (6), Copyright Act and Koblenz Court of Appeal, case no. 6 U 606/83, 
07.08.1986, NJW-RR 1987, p. 699.
26 See BT-Drucks. 15/837, p. 34.
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institution under equitable conditions. The required licensing fee must be 
equitable and the licensed offer easily accessible.27 It is left to the scientific 
publishers themselves to decide whether to market their works online directly 
or whether to be satisfied with a share of a lump-sum remuneration payment 
according to Article 52a IV, Copyright Act.
It has been correctly pointed out that this priority of an equitable licensing 
offer must consequently also pertain to the permissibility of digital copies 
for personal scientific research purposes.28 According to this reading, in the 
digital age, only the right to quote remains without restriction and free of 
charge. Incidentally, German copyright law plainly assumes that scientific 
communication takes place primarily via digital, access-controlled publishers’ 
databases. Contractual licences replace legal usage authorisations. These 
licences determine what an individual researcher may undertake with the 
contents of scientific publishers’ databases.
Finally, the provisions, which enable the authorisation-free, mass-
digitalisation of orphan and out-of-print works intended to strengthen the 
knowledge and information society, are mentioned. A work is orphaned when 
the rightholder cannot be determined or located; out-of-print means simply 
that a work is no longer supplied by the publisher. Orphan books, academic 
journals and other writings, works on film and sound storage media may be 
digitised and made available to the public for cultural and educational purposes 
by institutions that are publicly accessible and which serve the public interest, 
such as libraries, archives, museums and public broadcasting organisations. 
However, these privileged institutions must determine in advance through a 
diligent search that the specific work is genuinely orphaned. As the relevant 
provisions of Articles 61–61c, Copyright Act only permit the commercialisation 
of orphan holdings by publicly financed institutions within narrow limits, it 
seems questionable if and when a comprehensive indexing can be expected of 
orphan library holdings in the Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek and EUROPEANA 
under these strict constraints.29 Against this background, the provisions on 
out-of-print works (Articles 13d and e, Copyright Administration Act) appear 
more feasible. These provisions have placed the collecting societies Wort and 
Bild-Kunst in the position to license all books, academic journals, newspapers, 
magazines or other written works published prior to 1 January 1966 and which 
27 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 84/11, 20.3.2013, GRUR 2013, p. 1220 marginal note 39 ff. – 
Gesamtvertrag Hochschul-Intranet; Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 76/12, 28.11.2013, GRUR 2014, 
p. 549 marginal note 58 ff. – Meilensteine der Psychologie.
28 See Berger, Die öffentliche Zugänglichmachung urheberrechtlicher Werke für Zwecke der akademischen 
Lehre – Zur Reichweite des § 52a I Nr. 1 UhrG, GRUR 2010, pp. 1058, 1064.
29 See Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal notes 667–670. 
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are currently out of print, and located in the holdings of publicly accessible 
libraries, museums, archives, etc. for non-commercial digitising purposes.30 
1.2 Computer programs
Included among the works protected under section 2(1)(1), Copyright Act are 
computer programs, which are important both as a means of communication 
as well as being an object and result of research. Because software is subject to 
a special European Union (EU) Directive,31 its legal protection deviates from 
that of other work and must be examined separately.
As with other types of works, a distinction must be drawn at the outset 
between the ‘expressions’ of a computer program, which are eligible for 
protection, and the ideas and principles not protected under copyright which, 
as an element, form the basis for a computer program. Included among the 
expressions eligible for protection are the source and object codes but not, 
however, the user interface, the functionality of a computer program, the 
programming language or the file format.32
From a qualitative perspective, the source and object codes are protected 
if they represent individual works in the sense that they are the result of an 
author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria, in particular qualitative 
or aesthetic criteria, shall be applied in determining their eligibility for 
protection.33 Thus, all computer programs enjoy protection to the extent that 
they transcend an utterly banal programming effort.34 An assumption exists 
in this regard:35 ultimately, all computer programs that find an application in 
a relevant fashion in systems of scientific communication are protected under 
copyright. 
The exploitation rights in computer programs are essentially the same as 
those for other works. In particular, the source and object codes may not be 
reproduced, made available to the public or adapted (Article 69c, Copyright 
Act). There are, however, significant differences with respect to the limitations 
of the legal protection of software as compared with the remainder of copyright. 
The special provisions regarding computer programs permit usage without 
30 More specifically Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal notes 671–674.
31 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs (codified version), OJ no. L 111 from 5.5.2009, p. 16.
32 See Article 69a(1) and (2), Copyright Act; likewise CJEU, case no. C-393/09, 22.12.2010, GRUR 2011, 
p. 220 marginal notes 44–46 – BSA/Kulturministerium; CJEU, case no. C-406/10, 02.05.2012, EuZW 
2012, p. 584 marginal notes 39, 45 – SAS/World Programming.
33 Article 69a(3), Copyright Act.
34 BGHZ pp. 123, 208 – Buchhaltungsprogramm.
35 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 90/09, 20.9.2012, ZUM-RD 2013, p. 371 marginal note 23 ff. – 
UniBasic-IDOS.
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authorisation and remuneration only where this is necessary for the intended 
purpose including error correction, the making of a backup copy, observation, 
study or testing of a program, as well as for decompilation (Articles 69d and e, 
Copyright Act). According to the prevailing opinion, these special provisions 
supersede the general limitations on copyright and in particular the limitations 
in the interest of science, be it reproduction for personal scientific use, the 
dispatch of copies or usage within a smaller network of researchers.36 A 
controversial point of view holds that the right to quote remains applicable.37
1.3 Databases
The third protected subject matter important in scientific communication 
concerns databases. These too are subject to an individual EU Directive, 
governing protection requirements, the area of protection and limitations 
differing from other categories of works.38 In this regard, one must further 
differentiate between copyright protection for collections of works (collections) 
and database works, and the sui generis protection of other investment-intensive 
databases.
1.3.1 Copyright in collections and database works
Collections and database works are characterised according to Article 4, 
Copyright Act in that the selection or arrangement of the works, the data 
or other individual elements must constitute the author’s own intellectual 
creation. With such collections or databases, the primary purpose is not 
completeness; the purpose is rather the creative and individual selection or 
arrangement as seen in scientific volumes and encyclopaedias. The copyright 
owner of the collection/database is typically the publisher. Due to its selection 
work as the editor, it enjoys independent and extensive legal protection in 
addition to the authors’ copyrights in their individual contributions. Database 
works may be reproduced for one’s own scientific use, as long as this does not 
serve a commercial purpose.39 
36 Dreier, in: Dreier & Schulze (eds), Urheberrechtsgesetz, 4th edn, 2013, Article 69a, Copyright Act, marginal 
notes 3, 33; Grützmacher, in: Wandtke & Bullinger (eds), Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, 4th edn, 
2014, Article 69a Copyright Act marginal note 75.
37 Dreier, in: Dreier & Schulze (eds), (supra note 36), Article 69a Copyright Act, marginal note 34; to the 
contrary, Grützmacher, in: Wandtke & Bullinger (eds), (supra note 36), Article 69a, Copyright Act, 
marginal note 75 (‘Article 51, in its spirit and purpose, is still unsuitable for computer programs’).
38 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases, OJ no. L 77 from 27.3.1996, p. 20.
39 Section 53(5), sentence 2, Copyright Act.
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1.3.2 Sui generis protection of database makers
European copyright protects not only the selection and arrangement efforts 
of scientific publishers, but also those businesses that invest in a database. 
Whoever provides an ‘essential investment’ in the acquisition, examination 
or representation40 of works, data or other independent elements, receives 
an exclusive sui generis proprietary right for a period of 15 years following 
publication of the database. Thereby, an incentive for investment in electronic 
databases is established. The database maker (investor) disposes over an 
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute and make available to the public 
the database either in its entirety or, with respect to the total investment, 
a quantitatively or qualitatively essential portion.41 Even non-essential 
(individual) portions of a database may not be used to the extent that this 
occurs repeatedly and systematically and where a ‘normal’ analysis of the 
database would be affected.
Both the publisher’s copyright in a database and the database maker’s rights 
are independent of the type of information arranged or collected. In particular, 
the database does not have to be comprised of copyrighted material. Instead, 
any type of dataset is sufficient – for example, raw scientific data.42 Academic 
publishers are hereby accorded legal ownership, placing them in the position 
to control access to scientific information as such (the ‘content’).
Nevertheless, non-essential portions of a database – for example, an 
individual dataset – may be used without infringing the rights of the database 
maker. Furthermore, Article 87c(1)(2) states that the reproduction of essential 
portions of a database, according to the nature or extent, is permissible for 
personal scientific use if and insofar as the reproduction is justified for that 
purpose and the scientific use does not serve commercial purposes and where 
the source is clearly cited. Repeated and systematic retrievals, however, are 
always prohibited so that, for example, scientific analyses of publishers’ 
databases (‘data mining’) require the agreement of the database investor.43
40 Not, however, in the original production of the data, etc. See CJEU, case no. C-203/02, 09.11.2004, 
EuZW 2004, p. 757, marginal note 28 ff. – The British Horseracing Board Ltd and Ors. v. William Hill 
Organization Ltd.
41 Thereby, the value of the individual dataset is not meant, rather the relevance of the extracted portion 
with respect to the protected investment. See CJEU, case no. C-203/02, 09.11.2004, EuZW 2004, p. 757, 
marginal note 28 ff. – The British Horseracing Board Ltd and Ors. v. William Hill Organization Ltd.
42 CJEU, case no. C-545/07, 05.03.2009, GRUR 2009, p. 572, marginal note 73 – Apis/Lakorda.
43 Reichman & Okediji, When copyright law and science collide: Empowering digitally integrated research 
methods on a global scale, Minnesota Law Review 96 (2012), pp. 1362, 1423.
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1.4  Protection of scientific editions and posthumous works and press 
publishers’ related rights
Finally, three ‘related rights’ to copyright need to be pointed out which have a 
certain relationship to scientific communication but which possess only slight 
practical significance. Article 70, Copyright Act accords the ‘author’ of a scientific 
edition of a non- or no-longer copyright-protected work or text a 25-year right 
in such an edition if it represents the result of scientifically organised activity 
and differs substantially from previously known editions of the work or text. 
According to Article 71, Copyright Act, one who publishes a non- or no-longer 
copyright-protected work for the first time (for example, a scientific manuscript 
which was thought to be lost) likewise enjoys a 25-year exclusive right to 
exploit the posthumous work. The related right for press publishers (Articles 
87f–h, Copyright Act) should indeed ultimately find application with respect to 
academic journals.44 However, this only extends to the making available to the 
public of such ‘press products’ or portions thereof through commercial search 
engines and news aggregators.
1.5 Legal protection of technical protection measures
Irrespective of all these copyright authorisations, a rightholder is able to prevent 
all unauthorised usage of its protected subject matter, specifically a scientific 
database, through the employment of technical protection measures (digital 
rights management or DRM) and to sanction this in its licensing terms and 
conditions. Thus, even the access to an individual dataset, and thereby specific 
scientific information, can be made dependent on the acquisition of a licence. 
This model of access-controlled databases, already established in practice, is 
legalised and promoted by European copyright law in that the technical and 
actual control is placed under additional legal protection. Concerning the 
legal protection of technical protection measures, a distinction must be made 
between computer programs on the one hand, and protected scientific subject 
matter on the other.
1.5.1 Legal protection of technical protection measures in computer programs
To the extent that computer programs are supplied with DRM measures, only 
the directive on the legal protection of computer programs from 1991 has 
relevance.45 Insofar Article 69f(2), Copyright Act determines that a rightholder 
44 Jani, in: Wandtke & Bullinger (eds), (supra note 36), Article 87f, Copyright Act, marginal note 4.
45 On the specialty of the computer program directive, CJEU, case no. C-128/11, 03.07.2012, GRUR 2012, 
p. 904 – UsedSoft.
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may demand the destruction of such means solely intended to simplify the 
unauthorised removal or circumvention of any technical protection measures, 
such instruments are declared illegal per se. While usage of these instruments 
in the circumvention of DRM systems is not explicitly prohibited, case law 
nevertheless grants rightholders such defence entitlements, and this on the basis 
of general private law (intentional damage contrary to public policy, section 
826 of the German Civil Code) and the right against unfair competition.46 
1.5.2 Legal protection of technical protection measures in other works and databases
Directive 2001/29/EC,47 implemented in Articles 95a ff., Copyright Act, governs 
DRM systems which control the usage of individual scientific works and in 
particular scientific databases. According to this, circumvention of effective 
technological measures is prohibited, as well as rendering this possible by 
producing and offering of circumvention tools. A DRM system is considered 
‘effective’ and thereby protected when an access or reproduction control has 
been put in place. It is sufficient that the average user may be hindered in 
deactivating the measure. It must be assumed that in practice, DRM systems 
put in place by scientific publishers enjoy legal protection, even though they 
may be continually circumvented.
With the aid of DRM systems, scientific publishers and database producers 
are able to override all science-relevant limitations. Articles 95b(1)(5) and 
(6)(b) determine that a rightholder who implements technical protection 
measures must subsequently make available to scholars all necessary means 
so that they may make use of the limitations of Article 52a (intranet usage) 
and Article 53(2) first sentence and (2)(1) (reproduction for scientific use). 
This regulation remains, however, practically irrelevant. Still more important 
is that, according to explicit rules, this does not apply to online databases.48 
This means when a DRM system is utilised, seminal exploitation of scientific 
works and databases over the Internet may take place with complete disregard 
for the limitations of copyright law.
1.6 Conclusion
On the whole, copyright protects and promotes the business model undertaken 
by most scientific publishers: an exclusive, access-controlled online database, 
46 On Article 1 of the Act against Unfair Competition (former version), Federal Supreme Court, case no. I 
ZR 220/95, 09.11.1995, GRUR 1996, p. 78 – Umgehungsprogramm.
47 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ no. L 167 
from 22.6.2001, p. 10.
48 Article 95b(3), Copyright Act.
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the usage of which is subject to a flat rate (‘big deal’) or an individual (‘pay-per-
click’) licensing fee. In this business model, the traditional distinction between 
the copyright-protected ‘form’ and freely accessible scientific ‘content’ is 
null and void. The interested user is only able to access even raw scientific 
data, theories and expressions when he or she has procured licensed access 
to the online database. European copyright provides publishers and database 
producers with total control over scientific information on the Internet.49
2 Scientific works and databases as contract subject matter
The conclusion above implies that the powers of copyright lie completely with 
the publisher. Apart from the database maker’s right, which originally derives 
from the investor, for this purpose, a contractual acquisition of rights from the 
authors, i.e. scholars, is necessary.50 They are free to decide when and with 
whom they assign their rights, and to what extent.
2.1 The original rightholder in scientific works
The original copyright owner in a work is its ‘creator’ – the ‘author’ (Article 7, 
Copyright Act). With respect to scientific works, the creator is the person 
who formulates the scientific literature or who realises a concrete scientific 
representation (for example, a model). However, a scientific discovery, the 
establishment of a theory or the production of raw data does not result in 
copyright. Scientists who confine themselves to this are not ‘authors’ as defined 
by copyright; copyright is tied rather to the concrete expression in language 
or representation of this information alone.51 According to this definition, 
the original rightholder is also a scientist who is either employed or tenured 
at a research institution and who has created a scientific work in fulfilment 
of obligations deriving from the employment or service relationship.52 In 
consideration of academic freedom, such works are fundamentally considered 
free and the personal achievement of the individual scientist. The employer 
acquires neither a tacit exploitation right upon conclusion of an employment 
49 Hilty, Das Urheberrecht und der Wissenschaftler, GRUR Int. 2006, pp. 179, 181.
50 Different from the producers of sound recording media or film material, publishers do not receive an 
original right related to copyright in published literary works. The business model in the publishing 
industry is based thus far on derived copyrights. On the rights related to copyright for press publishers, 
see section 1.4 above.
51 On this point, friction results from the right to claim identification in copyright, to which only the 
person who formulated the contribution or representation is entitled, and the scientific practice of 
claiming identification, according to which those who supply ‘only’ raw data are also identified as 
‘authors’.
52 See Article 43, Copyright Act.
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contract, nor are employed or tenured scientists required to submit an offer 
granting their employer an exploitation right in the works.53 
Case law, however, has recognised exceptions to this so-called ‘university 
professor’s privilege’. Thus, a professor’s heirs were required to offer to the 
university where he/she was active, possible copyrightable exploitation rights 
in extensive archaeological excavation materials, which could be of use for 
further research purposes.54 In a collection, specifically concerning a journal 
edited over many years at a university institute, the financing university tacitly 
acquired exploitation rights because it could not be assumed that numerous 
university employees should have worked in practice for the individual 
publisher.55 Finally, universities retain the exploitation rights in multiple-
choice exams drafted by research assistants who are under their direction.56 
Regarding traditional articles or monographs produced in individual or joint 
authorship, it remains the case that individual scholars alone may dispose of 
and freely decide to whom exploitation rights are granted.
2.2 Copyright contract law and scientific publishers 
In German copyright contract law, this power of disposition is secured in 
numerous ways. The regulations are based on the idea that individual authors 
are in a weaker position structurally as opposed to commercial middlemen, 
such as publishers, and therefore require legal protection.57 
Copyright is not transferable among those still living (Article 29, Copyright 
Act). And where in doubt, the author also grants exploitation rights according 
to the so-called ‘transfer purpose principle’ only insofar as the purpose 
envisaged by both parties to the contract makes this necessary.58 Where the 
holder of an exclusive exploitation right does not exercise the right or does 
so insufficiently or where the author no longer stands behind the work, he or 
she may revoke the exploitation right.59 Payment of equitable remuneration 
is compulsory for the granting of exploitation rights.60 However, exceptions 
are recognised specifically with respect to works for academic qualification 
53 Dreier, in: Dreier & Schulze (eds), (supra note 36), Article 43, Copyright Act, marginal note 12 with 
further references.
54 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 244/88, 27.09.1990, NJW 1991, pp. 1480, 1483 – 
Grabungsmaterialien.
55 Berlin Superior Court, case no. 5 U 2189/93, 06.09.1994, NJW-RR 1996, p. 1066 – Poldok.
56 Cologne District Court, case o. 28 O 161/99, 01.09.1999, NJW-RR 2000, pp. 1294, 1295.
57 Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal note 932 ff.
58 See Article 31(5), Copyright Act and Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal note 980 ff.
59 See Articles 41, 42, Copyright Act. See further the provisions of the Publishers’ Act (Verlagsgesetz) which, 
however, only affect traditional print publishing and not online rights.
60 Articles 32, 32a, 32b, 36 and 36a, Copyright Act.
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and other scientific contributions because the respective works can only be 
published economically when the publisher is not liable for remuneration 
(rather, only receives a subsidy for printing costs).61 
Of further interest to scientific journals and collections is the regulation 
whereby the publisher or editor may, in cases of doubt, acquire an exclusive right 
of reproduction, distribution and making available to the public. The author 
may however otherwise reproduce, distribute and make available to the public 
the work upon expiry of one year, unless otherwise agreed.62 This provision 
serves the purpose of making a second publication possible. Admittedly, 
this non-mandatory rule of doubt only takes effect once the publisher has 
explicitly ensured a grant of comprehensive, exclusive exploitation rights. This 
shortcoming should be avoidable through the compulsory second publication 
right for scientific authors according to Article 38 IV, Copyright Act, valid since 
2014, which is dealt with in detail in the context of the relationship between 
copyright and open access.63
Between 1966 and 2008 it was still the case that exploitation rights could 
not be granted effectively for yet unknown types of exploitation. The purpose 
of this provision was to ensure that the publisher, upon development of a 
new technology, would subsequently be forced to acquire authorisation from 
the author at a separate price. Accordingly, up until the early 1990s, scientific 
publishers were unable to obtain the rights for the online exploitation of 
scientific works.64 As the intended subsequent acquisition of rights proved 
unfeasible in practice (cf. orphan works), in 2008, the prohibition against 
granting exploitation rights concerning unknown types of exploitation was 
lifted and replaced by an agreement-in-writing requirement, a right of refusal 
and a special right to remuneration.65 For publishing contracts concluded 
between 1966 and the beginning of the 1990s, it would have remained the case 
that publishers were not authorised for exploitation on the Internet. In order 
to place them in the position of being able to import their archives into online 
databases, a legal fiction was codified whereby the online rights were deemed 
as granted to the publisher when the author exclusively granted all other 
exploitation rights, unlimited by location and in perpetuity.66 Whether this 
provision actually results in scientific publishers being authorised to include an 
entire publishing portfolio in their online databases depends on the content of 
61 Schulze, in: Dreier & Schulze (eds), (supra note 36), Article 32, Copyright Act, marginal note 61.
62 Article 38(1) and (2), Copyright Act.
63 See section 3.2.2 below.
64 Ehmann & Fischer, Zweitverwertung rechtswissenschaftlicher Texte im Internet, GRUR Int. 2008, pp. 
284, 286.
65 Articles 31a and 32c, Copyright Act.
66 Article 137l, Copyright Act.
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the legacy contracts on a case-by-case basis. The subsequent, fictive acquisition 
of rights is generally denied to newspaper publishers, in particular.67 However, 
this segment is heavily impacted by the notion: ‘where there is no accuser, 
there is no judge’.
One can conclude from the provisions sketched above that applicable 
copyright contract law is completely tailored according to the traditional 
marketing model of (print) publishers. As opposed to many other copyright 
regimes, namely that of the Anglo-American copyright system, the provisions 
prevent an author’s complete loss of rights. At the same time, however, as 
a practical result, a similar acquisition of exclusive exploitation rights by 
publishers is possible and even fabricated with respect to online rights in the 
interest of the digital database business model.
2.3 Open content model
Alternatively, exploitation forms based on openness and access such as free/
open source software and Creative Commons have, on the other hand, only 
had an impact on current copyright contract law in so-called ‘Linux clauses’. 
Accordingly, an author may grant a basic exploitation right to everyone, free 
of charge and without regard for a written agreement for unknown types of 
use.68 With these provision, the legislator recognises that open content models 
‘represent effective communication and cooperation structures’, which create 
a new interest and protection arrangement between authors, exploiters 
and end users, to which the statutory compensation and written agreement 
requirements do not fit.69 
Open content contracts are indeed based on the copyright of the author/
licensor, who offers utilisation of a work to all interested users in either a 
comprehensive or specific respect. As opposed to other traditional publishing 
agreements, the granting of exploitation rights/licensing contracts does not serve 
the purpose of procuring an exclusive legal position for an individual acquirer. 
Rather, the fundamental idea goes in another direction where everyone may 
use the work free of charge – or where required, under certain conditions, 
such as a prohibition against commercial exploitation and identification of the 
67 The argument for this is based on Article 38(1) and (2), Copyright Act, whereby the author may 
otherwise reproduce and distribute his journal or collection contributions one year after publication, so 
that the publisher was never able to acquire ‘all essential’ exploitation rights; see Sprang & Ackermann, 
Der ‘Zweite Korb’ aus Sicht der (Wissenschafts-)Verlage, K&R 2008, pp. 7, 10; Ehmann & Fischer (supra 
note 64), p. 289.
68 Articles 31a(1), second sentence, 32(3), third sentence, 32a(3), third sentence, 32c(3), second sentence, 
Copyright Act.
69 See BT-Drucks. 14/6433, 15; BT-Drucks. 14/8058, 19; BT-Drucks. 16/1828, 37; BT-Drucks. 16/5939, 44.
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name of the author.70 Copyright is thus transformed, through the power of 
private and autonomous decision, from being an instrument for the limitation 
of access into being an instrument enabling, and in the case of open source 
software, even forcing openness.71 In systems of scientific communication, these 
contract models have attained increasing significance in the establishment of 
open access.72 
Yet, nowhere near all scientific works are furnished with a specific open 
content licence. Scholars often simply make their works available online 
without further explanation. Such action has been qualified by the Federal 
Supreme Court as simple consent excluding specific illegal uses. An authorised 
party, or another with his or her agreement,73 who makes texts or images 
freely available on the Internet without restriction, declares him- or herself 
as being in implied agreement with the ‘general acts of exploitation according 
to the circumstances’. The interpretation of implied consent must be oriented 
on objective content from the perspective of the recipient of consent. As 
the consent to general online exploitation is targeted at the general public, 
it can only be retracted through generally recognisable circumstances, such 
as the removal of material from one’s own home page or the activation of 
technical protection measures. A retraction with respect to an individual user 
with continued availability of the content is protestatio facto contraria irrelevant. 
Included in (legally permissible) general online exploitation is non-commercial 
reproduction by a private Internet user (downloading, printing)74 and image 
searches of so-called ‘thumbnails’.75 The legal status of simple consent has 
the potential to bring social (including scientific) and copyright norms closer 
without complicated licensing constructs.76
70 See Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal notes 855–857. 
71 On open source licences, see Jäger & Metzger, Open source software, 3rd edn, 2011; on Creative Commons 
licences, see Berlin District Court 16 O 458/10, 08.10.2010, MMR 2011, pp. 763, 763 ff.; further 
Krujatz, Open Access, 2012, p. 110 ff.
72 See subsection 3.2.2 below; and Jaeger & Metzger, Open Content-Lizenzen nach deutschem Recht, MMR 
2003, p. 431 ff.; Mantz, Open Access-Lizenzen und Rechtsübertragung bei Open Access-Werken, in: 
Spindler (ed.), Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen von Open Access-Publikationen, 2006, pp. 55 ff.
73 See, for example, Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 140/10, 19.10.2011, NJW 2012, p. 1886, 
marginal note 16 ff. – Vorschaubilder II.
74 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 94/05, 6.12.2007, NJW 2008, 751, marginal note 27 – Drucker und 
Plotter I.
75 Federal Supreme Court, case no. I ZR 69/08, 29.4.2010, NJW 2010, 2731, marginal note 28 ff., 33 ff. – 
Vorschaubilder I.
76 See Peukert, Der digitale Urheber, in: Bullinger et al. (eds), Festschrift für Artur-Axel Wandtke zum 70. 
Geburtstag, 2013, pp. 455 ff.
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2.4 Contract law and computer programs
The principles of copyright contract law mentioned above essentially also apply 
to computer programs. Here too, the programmer, as an author, is the original 
rightholder. Whether or not the programmer exercises his or her rights in the 
realisation of an exclusive exploitation or in any open source model rests with 
his or her private autonomous decision.
A special rule applies in the case of programmers in an employment 
relationship. Where a computer program is created by an employee during 
the execution of his or her duties or following the instructions of his or her 
employer, the employer is exclusively entitled to exercise all economic rights 
in the computer program, unless otherwise agreed.77 Out of consideration for 
academic freedom, this should not, however, apply to software programmed 
during free and individually guided research insofar as the rights remain 
exclusively with the employed/tenured scientist, while the universities, etc. 
are dependent on an explicit granting of exploitation rights.78 
2.5 Contract law and databases
As mentioned, a distinction must be made with respect to scientific databases. 
The original rightsholder in a collection or database work is the one who 
undertakes the selection or arrangement of the elements as a personal 
intellectual creation – as a rule, the editor.79 His or her contractual legal 
relationship to the publisher follows the same principle valid for works of 
scientific literature and representations. Thus, the editor has the power with 
respect to his or her intellectual creation of whether to grant an exclusive right 
or to select an open access model.
The sui generis right of database makers, however, originates in the hand of 
the investor, for example, a scientific publisher. Consequently, no contractual 
protection provisions exist to the benefit of the weaker author. Rather, the 
database maker acquires exploitation rights from the scientific author in 
the individual works contained in the database. The database maker then 
licenses all derived exploitation rights and original rights in the database to an 
institutional (for example, a university) or individual licensee. As a rule, the 
contract only permits the reproduction (downloading and printing) of database 
contents for personal scientific purposes. A more extensive exploitation, in 
particular in the form of further making available to the public or editing of 
77  Article 69b, Copyright Act.
78 Dreier, in: Dreier & Schulze (supra note 36), Article 69b, Copyright Act, marginal note 7.
79 Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal note 340. On the acquisition of exploitation rights in 
scientific collections through university employers, see subsection 2.1 above.
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database contents is, as a rule, not included in the licence and thus constitutes 
an infringement. The boundaries of permitted exploitation limitations in 
database licence contracts result primarily from consumer protection law 
and more precisely the General Terms and Conditions Act. Accordingly, the 
standard contract terms of scientific publishers may not be unusual and may 
not place the licensee unduly at a disadvantage contrary to the dictates of 
good faith.80 However, as copyright legalises and promotes the maximum 
control over database content up to and including a pay-per-click model, such 
restrictive contract terms are in principle valid.81
3 Criticism of current copyright in scientific works
3.1 The digital dilemma in the sciences
‘Copyright increasingly falls short in its function with respect to the production 
of scientific works.’82 This statement serves as an example of the widespread 
criticism of current copyright in scientific works.
This criticism begins with the argument that the logic of copyright deviates 
fundamentally from the communication conditions and norms within the 
scientific community.83 Generally, scholars do not publish because of the 
prospect of earning royalties; rather, they publish because of intrinsic motives 
and the acquisition of reputation, which is monetised indirectly. Copyright 
turns scientific communication to a large extent into an exclusive, marketable 
commodity, which as a single, isolated element (‘work’) is individually 
assigned to one specific person (‘author’) and is only available according to the 
stipulation of the potential buyer’s ability to pay. Scientific communication, 
on the other hand, in principle proceeds in a non-enclosed communication 
context, characterised by preferably complete references to the state of research 
(quotation), openness, universality, comprehensiveness and collaboration. 
The individual results, at least in the form of raw data, findings and theories, 
are viewed by the scientific community as being a public good, belonging to 
everyone and no one.
80 Sections 305, 307, German Civil Code; and Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal note 1157 ff.
81 Rehbinder & Peukert (supra note 3), marginal note 1171. However, by virtue of a special provision, 
contractual agreements with which, among other things, the usage of non-essential portions of a 
database are prohibited (Article 87e, Copyright Act) as well as the contractual exclusion of legally 
permissible uses of protected computer programs for the purpose of making backup copies, for test 
purposes and decompilation are null and void (Article 69g(2), Copyright Act).
82 Hilty (supra note 49), p. 179.
83 In detail Peukert, Das Verhältnis zwischen Urheberrecht und Wissenschaft: Auf die Perspektive kommt 
es an!, 4 JIPITEC p. 142 ff. (2012), with further references.
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These differences have always existed. But in the age of book printing, it 
was necessary to accept them if the transfer of knowledge was to be organised 
as a decentralised market. Publishers assumed the technologically and 
organisationally formidable task of spreading scientific findings. Since the first 
Copyright Act of 1710, the publishers’ business model has been based on the 
exclusive rights that were transferred or granted to them by scholars. This legal 
exclusivity promised profits and created an incentive to enter the scientific 
publishing market, which was in turn conducive to the degree of distribution 
of science and its communication conditions within the bounds of technical 
possibility. The ‘content’ of scientific work thereby remained copyright-free.
Digitalisation and the Internet have fundamentally changed the original 
conditions of traditional scientific publishing systems. Henceforth, scientists 
are able to undertake the representation and global distribution of their 
findings themselves; a traditional knowledge broker is, in principle, no longer 
necessary. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, copyright and with it the exclusive 
marketing model, were extended to digital networks. The business model of 
access-controlled databases made possible by copyright, which as mentioned 
conveys total control over scientific information, persists here. This creates the 
digital dilemma in copyright of scientific works: digitalisation allows maximum 
access and at the same time maximum control.84
This general conflict manifested itself around the turn of the century in 
the so-called ‘journal (price) crisis’.85 An ever-decreasing number of publishers 
active specifically in the science, technology and medicine (STM) segment 
demanded ever-expanding database packages, consistently with ever-higher 
prices, which forced libraries to cancel subscriptions to other journals and 
monographs. The Internet’s promise of guaranteeing comprehensive, global 
access, turned virtually into the opposite. A growing digital gap emerged 
between those who were able to benefit from a campus or national licence 
and those situated outside of academic organisations and located generally in 
the southern hemisphere who had to do without access.
The behaviour on the part of publishers in this respect, however, 
unequivocally pursued the logic of the database model made possible by 
copyright: the more content that is made available, the more dependent 
researchers are on access, and the higher the prices become to offer still more 
content, and so forth. The more this price screw was turned, the clearer an 
atypical value chain became from a copyright perspective: the public sector 
finances the production and for the most part, the representation and quality 
84 See in general Peukert, Das Urheberrecht und die zwei Kulturen der Online-Kommunikation, GRUR-
Beil. 2014, pp. 77–93.
85 See with further references, for example, Hilty (supra note 49), p. 183 ff.; Brintzinger, Piraterie oder 
Allmende der Wissenschaften?, 38 Leviathan pp. 331, 332 ff. (2010).
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control (peer reviewing) of scientific findings, which are subsequently assigned 
from scientists to publishers, who then license back the content to publicly 
financed libraries.
3.2 Suggested solutions 
As a reaction to this situation, which is increasingly seen as untenable even 
among academics, essentially two approaches are under consideration. These 
envision either changing scientific substantive law or they advocate in different 
forms that publicly financed research findings be made available to the public 
through the principles of open access.
3.2.1 Changing substantive copyright law
The most radical copyright-related approach is found in US draft legislation from 
2003 in which the US Copyright Act would have been changed to the extent 
that ‘copyright protection […] is not available for any work produced pursuant 
to scientific research substantially funded by the Federal Government’.86 
Meanwhile, this ‘Public Access to Science Act’ failed to pass the initial hurdles 
of the US legislative process and has not been taken up again since. One likely 
reason is that abolition of copyright in scientific works is incompatible with 
international law conventions on copyright.87
A discussion of copyright in scientific works is therefore concentrated 
on an expansion of scientifically related limitations to copyright – in other 
words, on additional legal usage permissions. Discussions along these lines are 
taking place at the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) on an 
international law agreement in the interest of education and the sciences, so 
far without even coming close to an international consensus.88 At national 
level in Germany, committees of the Federal Parliament and Federal Assembly 
have called for the introduction of a ‘broader and more general education and 
science limitation’.89 In the literature it has been suggested that written works 
produced within the framework of teaching and research activities financed 
primarily by public funds and published in periodicals should be available 
86 H.R.2613 Public Access to Science Act, 108th Congress (2003–2004), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c108:H.R.2613.
87 See supra note 1. 
88 See http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations/index.html.
89 See BR-Drucks. 737/1/12 from 5.12.2012, p. 2; further the recommended decision and report of the 
Judiciary Committee of the German Lower House from 4.7.2007, BT-Drucks. 16/5939, p. 26 ff.; the 
Third Preliminary Report of the Investigative Commission, Internet und digitale Gesellschaft [Internet and 
the Digital Society] – Copyright, 23.11.2011, BT-Drucks. 17/7899, 21; De la Durantaye (supra note 21), 
p. 191 ff.
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to the public for purposes of access to information for the first six months 
following their initial publication, […] to the extent that this is necessary for 
the pursuit of non-commercial purposes.90 
According to another draft, 
the use of a published work through public intuitions, who have been assigned 
tasks in the areas of education, sciences and culture […] is permissible insofar 
as this is justifiable within the scope of their duties and in the pursuit of non-
commercial aims […] within the framework of 1. teaching and research, 2. 
advanced training and further education, and 3. documentation, conservation 
and preservation.91 
Proposals for a general education and scientific limitation follow a similar 
direction, permitting, among others, uses ‘for purposes of scientific research’ 
being specified through legal examples.92 The permitted use should, in each 
case, trigger a right for remuneration, which is to be asserted by a collecting 
society.
The reservation in favour of non-commercial scientific use in all of 
these proposals takes the requirements of the EU InfoSoc Directive into 
consideration.93 This restriction is considered problematic to a certain 
extent because commercial research in businesses is also dependent on 
comprehensive access. A corresponding change to European copyright is 
therefore also necessary with respect to a reorganisation of legal protection 
for technical protection measures, which should no longer enjoy a preference 
over limitations to copyright.94 The European Commission would also like to 
improve the copyright-related conditions for commercial and non-commercial 
research, in particular concerning text and data mining.95
The proposals on the expansion of copyright-related limitations have in 
common that the exclusive right in scientific works with respect to certain 
uses is reduced to the author’s remuneration right. Public research that is not 
commercially oriented and educational institutions would be authorised, and 
90 Hansen, Zugang zu wissenschaftlicher Information – alternative urheberrechtliche Ansätze, GRUR Int. 
2005, pp. 378, 383 ff.
91 Pflüger, Positionen der Kultusministerkonferenz zum Dritten Gesetz zur Regelung des Urheberrechts in 
der Informationsgesellschaft – ‘Dritter Korb’, ZUM 2010, pp. 938, 944.
92 De la Durantaye (supra note 21), p. 213 ff.
93 See Article 5(3) lit. a InfoSoc Directive 2001/29/EC (supra note 44).
94 Reichman & Okediji (supra note 43), pp. 1432 ff. and 1440 ff. (also for scientific exploitation for 
subsequent commercial use).
95 European Commission, Strategy for a Digital Single Market for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final, 6.5.2015, p. 8.
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at the same time liable, to pay. Their offerings would nevertheless compete 
with publishers’ access-controlled databases.
Another approach pursues models of compulsory licences96 or an obligation 
to contract.97 Through these instruments, publishers would be compelled to 
open up their databases to competitors, who may then offer this scientific 
information in a differently edited form, so that a price competition between 
numerous commercial database providers, who essentially offer substitutable 
products, would arise. The desired effect would be, on the one hand, lowering 
of prices for scientific databases, and on the other, an increased incentive for 
publishers to edit and network scientific content optimally.
Both the proposals favouring broad scientific limitations and the approaches 
just discussed ultimately result in a situation where scientific works would 
no longer exist exclusively in access-restricted publishers’ databases. Instead, 
an additional source of information would be available. Both conceptions, 
however, differ with respect to the question of whether this additional source 
is a freely available server of public education and research institutions (a 
limitations solution) or a DRM-protected database of one or more commercial 
‘information brokers’ (a compulsory licence model). While the advocates of 
a broad scientific limitation above all seek to guarantee unhindered access to 
scientific information, the advocates of a compulsory licence or an obligation 
to contract worry no less about the structuring and processing of an otherwise 
overwhelming flood of data.
All of the abovementioned proposals, however, encounter very considerable 
political, in addition to legal reservations. Publishers in particular argue that 
the instruments of the critics impair the ‘normal exploitation’ of protected 
scientific subject matter in the form of an exclusive database model. Such 
a legislative intrusion into the (derived) copyright-related exclusivity in 
the digital environment is incompatible with relevant international and 
European guidelines.98 These objections are, at any rate, justified insofar as 
digital copyright serves precisely the purpose of providing authors and their 
publishing partners with full exclusivity, up to and including a pay-per-click 
96 Hilty, Renaissance der Zwangslizenzen im Urheberrecht? – Gedanken zu Ungereimtheiten auf der 
urheberrechtlichen Wertschöpfungskette, GRUR 2009, pp. 633, 641 ff. With reference to access 
rights according to media law, see also Peifer, Wissenschaftsmarkt und Urheberrecht: Schranken, 
Vertragsrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht, GRUR 2009, pp. 22, 28.
97 Krujatz (supra note 71), pp. 279 ff. and 280 (authors and publishers as the owners of an exclusive 
exploitation right in a scientific literary work are obligated ‘to grant a right of reproduction, making 
available to the public and distribution for the purpose of further publication in another manner than 
the first publication to every other intermediary on equitable conditions,’ as long as the source of the 
first publication is given).
98 See Articles 9(2), Bern Convention, 13 TRIPS, 10 WCT, 16(2) WPPT, 5(5) InfoSoc Directive 2001/29; 
and for interpretation, see Senftleben, Copyright, limitations and the three-step test, 2004. To the 
contrary, however, see Hansen (supra note 90), p. 384 ff.; De la Durantaye (supra note 21), p. 204 ff.
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structure. Proposals which hollow out the centre of this business model are 
indeed therefore incompatible with prevailing international and European 
copyright law.99 
Ultimately, the structural weakness of all the proposals addressing 
copyright needs to be pointed out. As with copyright itself, the limitations, 
compulsory licences and obligations to contract only apply in the territory of 
those legislatures that have enacted these regulations.100 A regulation in the 
interest of digital science limited to and therefore only implemented within 
the territory of Germany or the EU would miss the inherent global character of 
scientific communication from the outset. Specifically, the gap between north 
and south would remain.101
3.2.2 Open access
The open access (OA) movement seeks to avoid precisely these deficits in a 
genuine copyright-related solution. It pursues worldwide technically and 
legally unrestricted access to scientific information, without the necessity of 
modifying substantive copyright law.102
Relationship to copyright. The copyright-related starting point of the OA 
movement is the recognition that it is left to the individual rightsholder 
whether and how his or her right is exercised. Copyright in no way forces 
scholars, as the original rightsholders, into an exclusive form of exploitation. 
Rather, scholars may decide to release their work either completely or with 
certain caveats. The vast majority of copyright laws in the world permit a 
complete waiver of rights so that the work enters the public domain. In this 
respect, even the restrictive German copyright law explicitly stipulates that 
an author may grant an unremunerated, non-exclusive exploitation right for 
every person. In addition, there is the option to agree to the act of exploitation 
in an informal and implied manner. The author may reserve certain rights, 
in particular with respect to direct commercial exploitation and the author’s 
moral rights.103 Consequently, copyright does not stand in the way of an 
immediate, complete and worldwide shift in scientific communication to an 
OA first publication – if the authors concerned so desire.
99 Correct in this respect, Peifer (supra note 96), p. 25; in detail on international law, Peukert, A bipolar 
copyright system for the digital network environment, 28 Hastings Communications & Entertainment Law 
Journal (Comm/Ent), pp. 1–80 (2005).
100 In detail, Peukert, Territoriality and extraterritoriality in intellectual property law, in: Handl, Zekoll & 
Zumbansen (eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational legal authority in an age of globalization, 2012, pp. 
189–228.
101 To the contrary, Hilty (supra note 96), p. 638 (open access is only a territorial solution).
102 See in addition the contributions by Herb and by Ball in this volume. Further, German UNESCO 
Commission, Open Access – Chancen und Herausforderungen, 2007.
103 See section 2.2 above. 
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And not least, copyright may be exercised in such a flexible way that a 
publisher may, if necessary, be granted an exclusive exploitation right for a 
specific period of time, but the author reserves the right to make the work 
available to the public for non-commercial purposes, either himself or herself 
or through others at the same time, time-delayed, and in the same or a 
differing format.104 In other words, copyright also permits a co-existence of the 
publisher and OA models. From this perspective, copyright guarantees above 
all decision-making power on the part of the scientist/author for one or the 
other form of scientific publication.
However, should there be an unlimited granting of exclusive online and 
reproduction rights in favour of a publisher, the author, in the exercise of his 
or her personal autonomy, has waived the right to opt for open access. Should 
the work then nevertheless and without the publisher’s authorisation be 
made available on the Internet, the author would violate both the publishing 
contract and the publisher’s exclusive exploitation right.105 In this case, the 
author personally commits an act of copyright infringement. This scenario is 
considered a relevant obstacle to the broader expansion of so-called ‘green OA’, 
as by no means do all publishing contracts permit a parallel OA publication 
of the manuscript from the outset. Many scholars lose out on this option in 
that they sign publishing contracts unmindfully or, if need be, perceive the 
negotiation of an exception in favour of a delayed open access as pointless or 
shy away from the effort altogether. 
This lock-in effect should be breached through the mandatory secondary 
publication right according to Article 38(4) Copyright Act. According to this, 
the author of a scientific contribution – which is the result of a research project 
publicly funded by at least 50% and which has appeared in a collection which 
is published periodically at least twice per year – has the right, even if he or 
she has granted the publisher or editor an exclusive right of use, to make the 
contribution available to the public in the accepted manuscript version upon 
expiry of 12 months after first publication, unless this serves a commercial 
purpose, and where the source of the first publication is indicated. The purpose 
of this regulation is to place scholars who received public financing in the position 
to make their contributions available to the public without remuneration in 
the manner of downstream green open access. Falling within the ambit of the 
provision are not only contributions produced in publicly sponsored, third-
104 Article 32(3), sentence 2, Copyright Act. Ultimately, the author retains a non-exclusive exploitation 
right in the work. So that the reservation becomes contractual subject matter, the author must declare 
the reservation upon submission of the manuscript or change a differently worded publishing contract 
either through deletion or amendment. Agreement on the part of the publisher to the changed terms 
may also be implied should the publisher publish the work as agreed without addressing the reservation 
again (see section 151, first sentence, no. 2., Alt. German Civil Code).
105 See Schulze, in: Dreier & Schulze (eds) (supra note 36), section 31, Copyright Act, marginal note 56.
224
THE FUTURE OF THE SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING SYSTEM
party-funded projects or at extra-university research institutions, but the 
entire research output of state universities.106 The regulation has mandatory 
character insofar as the right of secondary publication, as far as the publisher 
is concerned, may not be waived. And still it remains a personal autonomous 
exercisable right of the publicly financed scientific author, who is not obligated 
to undertake a downstream OA publication. The voluntary principle of open 
access is not contested by the mandatory right of secondary publication; 
rather, it is safeguarded with respect to stronger negotiating partners, such as 
publishers.107 The author’s disposition authority is restricted; however, not the 
scope of protection of copyright. The proposal is therefore correctly seen as 
unproblematic in terms of international, union and constitutional law.108 
The obligation for open access for publicly financed research findings. The mandatory 
right of secondary publication has the effect that exclusive publishing rights, as 
an obstacle for green OA, expire after certain embargo periods. Especially in the 
humanities, significant reservations exist with respect to OA, which, according 
to the comments so far, have their roots in scientific systems themselves 
rather than in copyright.109 Even if all publicly financed scholars were to make 
their contributions available in downstream green OA, this would lead to a 
co-existence of OA and publishing systems. As this condition is viewed as 
unsatisfactory, there are increasing calls for the establishment of mandatory 
OA requirements across the board as the primary form of publication. Its 
implementation would result in a situation where in addition to the production 
and representation, the propagation of scientific findings would be transferred 
into the publicly financed academic system, while publishers would withdraw 
from the value chain for scientific publications.110
At the height of the journal price crisis more than 10 years ago, a proposal 
was put forward to change Article 43, Copyright Act to the effect that authors 
employed by a university would be obligated to offer their work, produced 
within the framework of their teaching and research activities, for publication 
to the university – where necessary non-exclusively. Only when a work was not 
claimed by the institution within a period of two months would the scholar be 
entitled without restriction to the exploitation right according to copyright.111 
106 In detail, Peukert, in: Schricker & Loewenheim, 5th edn, 2016, section 38, marginal note 45 ff. with 
further references.
107 Hansen (supra note 90), p. 382.
108 Hansen (supra note 90), p. 382.
109 See Taubert & Weingart, ‘Open Access’ – Wandel des wissenschaftlichen Publikationssystems, in: Sutter 
& Mehler (eds), Medienwandel als Wandel von Interaktionsformen, 2010, pp. 159, 170 ff.
110 On this ultimately decisive question, Brintzinger (supra note 85), p. 344; Finch Group Report, 
Accessibility, Sustainability, Excellence: How to expand access to research publications, 2012, http://apo.org.au/
sites/default/files/Finch-Group-report-FINAL-VERSION.pdf, p. 11.
111 Pflüger & Ertmann, E-Publishing und Open Access – Konsequenzen für das Urheberrecht im 
Hochschulbereich, ZUM 2004, pp. 436, 441 ff.
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This solution, based on the German Act on Employees’ Inventions,112 would 
have the effect that the decision regarding OA publication would no longer 
lie with the scholar but rather with the public employer. Current reservations 
with respect to OA would be overturned by shifting the authority of consent 
to the academic organisation. Even if a university were to claim only a non-
exclusive exploitation right in the relevant work, it would be entitled to the 
decision of whether and how this right is exercised. The scientific author would 
have to push for an adequate exercise of the exploitation right by appealing 
to the fiduciary duty from the employment contract. This proposal was met 
with unanimous rejection on the part of OA proponents.113 The two-month 
reservation period with regard to the assertion of exploitation rights by itself 
would present an unconstitutional intrusion in the heart of personal academic 
freedom in the form of a free decision on first publication.114 
An alternative model does not begin with the individual scholar and his 
or her copyright, but rather with the general institutional and academic law 
conditions of the publication industry.115 The starting point would be a regulation 
in university law in which articles and monographs produced in the context of 
teaching and research activity funded by at least 50% public financing would 
be published first according to OA principles.116 This legal framework would 
have to be rendered more precisely in the internal statutes and charters of 
universities extending into work and project-financing contracts in terms of an 
obligation in principle for an OA first publication.117 These obligations would 
be sanctioned in the qualification, appointment and evaluation statutes, which 
from a certain cut-off date would only recognise contributions first published 
112 See Article 42, Act on Employees’ Inventions.
113 Hansen (supra note 90), p. 379 ff.; Steinhauer, Das Recht auf Sichtbarkeit, 2010, p. 31, but then 
considering id., 72.
114 See Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 174, 178, 191/71 among others, 1.3.1978, BVerfGE 47, 
327, 381 ff.; Schmidt-Assmann, Wissenschaft – Öffentlichkeit – Recht, in: Dreier (ed.), Rechts und 
staatstheoretische Schlüsselbegriffe: Legitimität – Repräsentation – Freiheit, 2005, pp. 67, 77.
115 See in detail, Peukert, Ein wissenschaftliches Kommunikationssystem ohne Verlage – zur rechtlichen 
Implementierung von Open Access als Goldstandard wissenschaftlichen Publizierens, in: Grünberger & 
Leible (eds), Die Kollision von Urheberrecht und Nutzerverhalten im Informationszeitalter, 2014, pp. 145 ff.
116 On the whole, this corresponds with the so-called golden road to OA, which favours the first publication 
of a scientific contribution in an OA journal, and likewise the first publication of other scientific writings 
such as monographs, collections, etc. in an OA form.
117 Tendencies in this direction are found in particular in the UK in reaction to the Finch Group Report 
(supra note 109). However, the intended obligatory OA principles are conceived to enable a coexistence 
between OA and publishers, where either a first publication is reserved for hybrid OA journals financed 
by publishers or secondary publication after observation of an embargo period; see Higher Education 
Funding Council for England, HEFCE statement on implementing open access, http://www.hefce.
ac.uk/news/newsarchive/2012/statementonimplementingopenaccess/; RCUK announces new Open 
Access policy, http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/media/news/2012news/Pages/120716.aspx. Similar requirements 
also apply to research support by federal agencies in the United States; see Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Expanding Public Access to the Results of Federally 
Funded Research, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ostp_public_access_
memo_2013.pdf.
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in open access as capable of consideration. Exceptions would be granted only 
in consideration of special academic interests – such as participation in an 
international collection released by a publisher or for international students.
From an infrastructural and institutional perspective, such a realignment of 
systems of scientific communication would be very long on requirements.118 
Moreover, the question concerning constitutionality presents itself again. 
Scientific publishers would be massively affected, because they would be 
practically taken out of action as the primary intermediaries of publicly financed 
science. However, a fundamental right to the preservation of a customer base 
and business model does not exist;119 occupational freedom may be restricted 
in the interest of an overriding public interest – in this case, the access to 
publicly financed research findings.120 
The decisive issue, on the other hand, would be the question of whether a 
fundamental and far-reaching sanctioning of an OA obligation is compatible 
with scientific freedom. To some extent, such an obligation has been categorised 
as an unconstitutional intrusion into the heart of scientific freedom, which 
protects not only the if and when, but also the how and where of a publication.121 
According to another view, Article 5(3) of the German Constitution does 
not present an obstacle for a realignment of the basic conditions of scientific 
communication to open access, should this be desired by the legislator and 
academic institutions.122 
Regarding the latter view, it should be mentioned that the individual 
decision of when and in what media a contribution is published, remains 
unchanged exclusively with the scholar. The restriction of personal choice 
to OA media could be justified by the goal of the preservation and support 
of the functional capacity of universities and the protection of other subjects 
of fundamental rights, in particular students123 – for their part protected by 
118 Worthy of particular note are the requirements to replace the journal impact factor with author- or 
article-based evaluation criteria; to adapt the citation rules in OA publications; to establish additional 
OA journals and subject-specific repositories, such as for German-language jurisprudence; to ensure 
sufficient peer reviewing in an OA system; to change the academic conventions to the effect that  
making available to the public a contribution in a repository is equivalent to the final ‘printing proof’; 
and certainly not least to bid farewell to the notion that academic articles must be published in a 
‘journal’ – and not for example in an institutional series of a faculty. See in more detail, Peukert (supra 
note 115), p. 163 ff.
119 Constitutional Court, case no. 2 BvO 1/65, 18.3.1970, BVerfGE 28, 119, 142; Constitutional Court, case 
no. 1 BvR 35/82, 31.10.1984, BVerfGE 68, 193, 222 ff.; BGH MMR 2007, pp. 704, 705 (a competitor has 
no right to the preservation of his customer base).
120 See for example, Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 459 u. 477/72, 2.10.1972, BVerfGE 36, 47, 59.
121 Rieble, Autorenfreiheit und Publikationszwang, in: Reuß & Rieble (eds), Autorschaft als Werkherrschaft in 
digitaler Zeit, 2009, pp. 29 ff.
122 Bäuerle, Open Access zu hochschulischen Forschungsergebnissen? Wissenschaftsfreiheit in der 
Informationsgesellschaft, in: Britz (ed.), Forschung in Freiheit und Risiko, 2012, pp. 1, 11 ff., 14.
123 See Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 1289/78, 7.10.1980, BVerfGE 55, 37, 68 ff.; Constitutional 
Court, case no. 1 BvR 1864/94, 26.2.1997, BVerfGE 95, 193, 212; Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 
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Article 5(3), first sentence of German Constitution. For this, free scientific 
activity must continue to be possible and safely practised under the application 
of the new framework for the publishing industry;124 an obligation under 
academic law for open access would, however, be unconstitutional if this 
would structurally endanger free academic activity and accomplishment.125 In 
this respect, the Constitutional Court grants the legislator the competence to 
assess and freedom to predict.126 But before these indicated and far-reaching 
changes to the internal norms of scientific communication come into effect, in 
particular concerning the selection of texts and the distribution of reputation 
in an OA system, an obligation to first publish in open access with the 
exclusion of publishers must be seen as being scientifically inadequate and 
for this reason unconstitutional.127 Finally therefore, this model only confirms 
that a fundamental change in systems of scientific communication can only be 
carried out step-by-step128 within the sciences themselves rather than being 
imposed from the outside through the law.
911/00 among others, 26.10.2004, BVerfGE 111, 333, 353 ff.; Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 
462/06, 28.10.2008, BVerfGE 122, 89, 114.
124 Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 424/71, 29.5.1973, BVerfGE 35, 79, 116 ff.; Constitutional Court, 
case no. 1 BvR 748/06, 20.7.2010, BVerfGE 127, 87, 115 ff.; Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 
911/00 among others, 26.10.2004, BVerfGE 111, 333, 355; Constitutional Court, case no. 2 BvL 4/10, 
14.2.2012, BVerfGE 130, 263 marginal note 159 ff.
125 Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 911/00 among others, 26.10.2004, BVerfGE 111, 333, 355; 
Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 748/06, 20.7.2010, BVerfGE 127, 87, 116; Constitutional 
Court, case no. 2 BvL 4/10, 14.2.2012, BVerfGE 130, 263 marginal note 160; Schmidt-Assmann, Die 
Wissenschaftsfreiheit nach Art. 5(3 GG als Organisationsgrundrecht, FS Thieme 1993, pp. 697, 701.
126 See Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 424/71, 29.05.1973, BVerfGE 35, 79, 117; Constitutional 
Court, case no. 1 BvR 911/00 among others, 26.10.2004, BVerfGE 111, 333, 356; Constitutional Court, 
case no. 1 BvR 748/06, 20.7.2010, BVerfGE 127, 87, 116; Constitutional Court, case no. 1 BvR 911/00 
u. a., 26.10.2004, BVerfGE 111, 333, 355 ff.; Constitutional Court, case no. 2 BvL 4/10, 14.2.2012, 
BVerfGE 130, 263 marginal note 160.
127 Peukert (supra note 115), p. 171.
128 Regarding the time frame see Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, 1990, p. 600 (it has taken 
respectively 200 or more years until society became accustomed to the alphabet and printing – an 
‘incredibly’ rapid change).
